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In 1988, this author asked the tele-
vision cable company in Riverside County 
to hook up to a home in its service area. 
The houses on either side were served. 
The company refused, explaining that it 
could accommodate only a certain num-
ber of houses and had "no room" on its 
system for the foreseeable future. The 
company has no competitor and has a 
lock on the county's business for the 
next twenty years. 
In 1989, this author's parents asked 
Viacom Cablevision Company-the exclu-
sive cable television franchisee in San 
Francisco-to hook up to all of the 
units in their cooperative apartment build-
ing. Viacom has the franchise until the 
year 2010. Viacom sent a letter to the 
coop, noting that it wanted 24-hour ac-
cess to the cable wiring in the building 
and demanding a key. The resident man-
ager explained that she is in the premises 
at all times and is available to escort 
any workers who need access to the 
building. Many senior citizens-one of 
whom is 100 years old-reside in this 
coop, and the building is in a high crime 
area. The key to the building is zealous-
ly protected and has never been distrib-
uted to anyone other than a single key 
to each resident. Viacom responded on 
September I, 1989 with the following 
letter to all residents: "Viacom Cable-
vision of San Francisco regrets to inform 
you that as of September 18, 1989, ser-
vice to the above address will be ter-
minated." 
Nothing in the franchise agreement 
between the City and Viacom allows the 
company unfettered access to homes and 
apartments. But it does have a monopoly-
for 21 years. And there is no alternative 
to abject compliance with any demand 
which might be made-apart from highly 
expensive and problematical litigation. 
Either comply with the demand-no mat-
ter what it is, or the service will be 
denied or taken away. The coop surrend-
ered its keys. 
These two personal anecdotes illus-
trate the verity of one of the most cliched 
aphorisms in the English language: "power 
corrupts, and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely." If one wishes to examine 
the price of monopoly power abuse, sur-
vey the food provided at the nation's 
airports. Examine its quality, the speed 
of service, the price. That is monopoly. 
Monopoly is like having to buy your 
hamburgers at the DMV. Monopoly is 
the ultimate totalitarian state. What dif-
ference does it make if you :iave political 
freedom to write letters to the editor if 
there is only one editor to send them to? 
The most troubling economic and 
political issue facing the citizens of this 
nation in the 1990s is the future of our 
media. From the media we get almost 
all of our information-political and 
economic. He or she who controls it 
controls us. 
Cable Monopoly 
Several alarming trends in the com-
munications industry portend threats to 
the information pluralism which under-
lies our basic freedoms. The first is the 
growing unchecked economic power of 
the cable television systems. In 1980, 
20% of California homes were on cable; 
now, most of California's homes receive 
their television reception from cable. 
Notwithstanding City of Los Angeles 
v. Preferred Communications, 1 which 
declared a theoretical first amendment 
interest in all~wing more than one cable 
franchise, over 95% of all current sub-
scribers have a single option-one mon-
opoly power cable carrier with, effective-
ly, an exclusive franchise granted by 
local government. The Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 19842 was a com-
promise between the National Cable 
Television Association and the National 
League of Cities. The Senate irresponsib-
ly bought the argument that there should 
be no common carrier regulation because 
cable service is "not essential" and "not 
a natural monopoly." The FCC compound-
ed this absurdity by finding that rate 
review is not needed where there is effect-
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ive competition, and that there is effect-
ive competition if a community has four 
or more over-the-air stations which reach 
the community. In 1987, the FCC re-
duced that required number to three. Of 
course, they all arrive in homes by the 
grace of the cable carrier. There is no 
federal rate regulation. No state regula-
tion either; nor does the state require 
even local rate regulation. The statute 
allows exclusive franchises to be granted 
by counties and cities-these franchises 
then operate as unfettered monopolies. 
Even if amending legislation were to 
correct this defect, local governments 
currently collect a "franchise fee" for 
themselves based on a percentage of 
gross revenues. Local governments are 
not about to compromise this source of 
income based directly on the revenues 
created by their franchisee. The higher 
the charge, the more they get. California 
franchise fees for local governments will 
exceed $50 million this year. No city or 
county seriously reviews rates in terms 
of a fair rate of return, as is required of 
other natural monopolies, nor at all. 
In terms of non-price regulation, the 
Act also gave substantial discretion to 
the cable operator to determine which 
stations will be carried and how access 
will be arranged. In fact, the statute 
specifically provides that "a city may 
deny a franchise renewal...but may not 
take into account the mix, quality or 
level of cable services or other services. "3 
Nor does the state. Nor does the FCC. 
Court decisions have generally prohib-
ited states from setting up monopolies 
or restraining trade. Federal antitrust 
law is paramount to state law under the 
supremacy clause of the Constitution; 
the states may restrain trade only if they 
do two things: (I) specifically authorize 
the restraint by law; (2) engage in active 
and independent state supervision to sub-
stitute for the absent marketplace. The 
requirement of independent state super-
vision is still in flux, but under cases 
like Hudson v. City of Chula Vista,4 it is 
working out to mean no supervision 
over prices if cities are even theoretically 
involved. 
The exclusive franchises are common-
ly granted for ten to fifteen years; some 
are for thirty years-that's until the year 
2020. There is very little competitive 
bidding. Rates vary between areas by 
more than 100% for basic services ia 
neighboring communities of similar size. 
Rates have been increasing annually at 
three times the rate of inflation or costs, 
and profits are soaring. Revenues now 
exceed one billion dollars per year. 
9 
One of the advantages of the exces-
sive profits of an unchecked monopolist 
is its ability to funnel large sums for 
political influence to assure the survival 
of its monopoly. The California Cable 
Television Association has channeled 
over $400,000 into campaign contribu-
tions since 1985, giving to 117 of the 
current 120 state legislators, in addition 
to the usual personal "honoraria" to 
legislators. Brown and Roberti have been 
particular beneficiaries. In 1988, the in-
dustry won passage of AB 1802 (Hill), 
allowing it to avoid property taxes on 
its right-of-way assets. The bill allows 
the industry to deduct these taxes straight 
from the franchise fees it pays local 
governments. 
The most extreme example of this 
confluence of corruptive economic and 
political power heretofore has been the 
insurance industry. Exempt from anti-
trust law, the industry raised over $60 
million for its largely deceptive 1988 
political proposition campaigns. To un-
derstand the scale here, one must realize 
that this is more than either the Demo-
cratic or Republican parties spent on 
the 1988 national presidential campaign-
apparently the most ever spent on a 
political campaign in American history. 
The insurance companies raised this 
money by agreeing collusively to an 
assessment of 1 % on all California pre-
miums. In other words, they fixed the 
price $60 million higher by a direct rate 
increase agreement passed on through 
to us. Maybe we got off easy; the figure 
could have been $100 million or $250 
million-and nobody would have stop-
ped them. 
This same dangerous juxtaposition 
exists vis-a-vis cable television. Except it 
is more ominous, because it involves 
communications and a structure even 
more dangerous than the voluntary car-
tel-monopoly. 
We have a traditional American 
model, and it goes like this: you com-
pete in an open marketplace or you are 
subject to regulation. If you have a mon-
opoly, you get at least maximum price 
review based on a fair rate of return 
standard, and you do not take your 
political money from the ratepayers but 
from the stockholders' profits-they are 
the ones who both control and benefit 
from your political spending. 
Media Concentration 
The second trend is related: the in-
creasing concentration of media owner-
ship in fewer hands. Let's start where we 
left off-with the cable systems-now 
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called "MSOs" or "multiple system oper-
ators" in the economic literature. The 
last five years have seen a startling in-
crease in that concentration, with merger 
mania unabated by a moribund Depart-
ment of Justice. We have theoretical 
FCC limitations on co-located (i.e., 
located in the same city) broadcast sta-
tions and newspapers and on broadcast 
stations and cable operators. But the 
Cable Communications Policy Act of 
19845 did an interesting thing: it left out 
any limitations at all on newspaper-cable 
television co-located common ownership. 
And this combination is by far the most 
dangerous in the long run. Once a com-
munity has one major newspaper and it 
then controls the cable system as well, 
the fact that there are two or three over-
the-air television stations reaching the 
community (usually through the cable 
system) may be small consolation. 
In 1975, the FCC promised to revisit 
the issue of cable-newspaper cross-owner-
ship-but then ruled that "Section 613 
of the Cable Act did not specifically 
give to the Commission the authority to 
impose such an ownership restriction. 
Therefore, this proceeding is termin-
ated. "6 Many commentators disagree 
with this legal analysis. Professor 
McGregor of Indiana University at Bloom-
ington breaches normally diplomatic 
scholarly etiquette in writing: "The FCC 
reasoning is specious and perhaps even 
consciously dishonest. ''7 
The 1984 Act did one other thing 
which makes the FCC's abdication from 
newspaper-cable limitation especially 
damaging: it prohibits local governments 
from even considering newspaper cross-
ownership in granting or renewing a 
cable franchise.s The FCC preempts 
local governments on this question, and 
then abandons the field. 
This license is contrary to the basic 
antitrust concepts which preserve our 
economic liberty, and it acts in the one 
industry where a lack of marketplace 
choice may affect our political liberty as 
well. Where a small number of private 
entities serve as possible choke points to 
our access to each other and ba~ic social/ 
political information, our democratic 
pluralism is in jeopardy. One actor in 
control of these powerful sources of in-
formation, with the power to select pro-
grams and stations, and able to hire and 
fire journalists, can very much influence 
what we know and think politically. In-
formation is power; its control is more 
telling over the long run than economic 
or even military power. 
I am not arguing that we have a 
total information monopoly in our major 
c1t1es. We still have some measure of 
diversity; in fact, to the extent cable 
access is afforded to more groups, we 
may have more diversity of opinion. But 
the mechanism for the choking of infor-
mation access, and indeed information 
domination by a very few decision-
makers, is now in place-and what is 
there to block it? The restraint of the 
enterprise? A tradition of not interfering 
in program content? Is that what we 
want to rely upon as a society? On what 
basis do we permit any cross-ownership 
control between radio, over-the-air tele-
vision, cable television, and newspapers? 
What do we gain in allowing these com-
bines? What do we lose? 
Exacerbating this problem is the grow-
ing concentration not only between types 
of media enterprises, but within news-
papers, entertainment, and cable systems, 
respectively. Economists call a "shared 
monopoly" an "oligopoly." We regret-
tably have an oligopoly, at best, in those 
controlling the provision of basic infor-
mation in our major cities. The News-
paper Preservation Act9 provided an 
inexplicably easy standard for declaring 
a newspaper "failing" to facilitate these 
unfortunate and often economically un-
necessary mergers. Economies of scale 
justifying these mergers could have as 
easily been provided by joint printing 
agreements without combined ownership. 
The Indiana Law Journal concluded in 
1971: "The NPA will not serve the pub-
lic's interest...[it] will insure the effective 
monopolization of the newspaper busi-
ness in the twenty-two cities where news-
papers are participating in joint opera-
tions. This monopolization is likely to 
effectively cripple the growth of small 
newspapers and prevent the establish-
ment of new competing dailies in these 
communities. "10 
The 1971 critique has proved correct. 
Now, single newspaper companies dom-
inate each of almost all of our nation's 
cities. Robert Picard, editor of the Jour-
nal of Economics, wrote recently: "Since 
1970, more than 200 newspapers have 
ceased operation. Only five have been 
"saved" by the act, and one of those 
repudiated its agreement and has again 
begun operating independently .... When 
the [joint operating agreements under 
the NPA] expire, the dominant paper 
can refuse to renew the agreement and 
the smaller paper will fold .... Of the 20 
JOAs currently in operation, the majority 
will expire in the 1990s and ... seven or 
eight ... can be expected not to be renewed. "11 
There is nothing wrong with a joint 
operating agreement to save a failing 
newspaper and preserve two separate 
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voices in a community, but the Act went 
way beyond that and allows price-fixing, 
profit pooling, and market allocation-
powers which should never be granted 
without public review to preclude abuse, 
which do not relate to the reason for the 
Act, and which are allowed in no other 
industry in America outside of cable 
television, trash hauling, and-except for 
California as of November 8, 1988-
insurance. 
The percentage of daily newspaper 
towns served by competing dailies has 
declined from 60% in 1910, to 21% in 
1930, to under 4% today. Not only has 
concentration increased among news-
papers but chains have evolved, raising 
information control concerns beyond 
individual cities and extending to entire 
regions. Sixty-three million daily news-
papers are printed and distributed in the 
United States: the largest ten companies 
controlled a shockingly high 37% of the 
total market in 1980; and as of 1987, 
that number was 43%. I predict that it 
will approach 50% by 1992. 
Finally, newspapers are merging with 
multi-media enterprises-including news 
magazines, movie production, and cable 
television. We just saw the merger of 
Time Inc. (which owns Fortune, Sports 
Illustrated, and the ubiquitous People 
magazine) with Warner Communications 
Inc. (which includes Warner Brothers, 
Lorimar, HBO, Cinemax, and Warner 
Cable Communications)-creating a $15 
billion megamedia company. The first 
divisions ordered united were Time's 
American Television & Communications 
and Warner Cable Communications. 
Of course, CBS Records has been 
bought by Japan's Sony. Germany's 
Bertelsmann has bought RCA and Double-
day Publishing. Britain's Robert Maxwell 
bought MacMillan. Australian Rupert 
Murdoch bought Twentieth Century Fox, 
including Fox Television, Harper & 
Rowe, and Triangle Publications (which 
publishes TV Guide). And he bought 
seven TV stations to boot. Recently, he 
announced plans to raise $1 billion to 
add new media properties to his news-
paper, magazine, TV, and movie holdings. 
There is now talk of Coca-Cola sell-
ing Columbia Pictures to America's big-
gest cable operator, Tele-Communications 
Inc. (TCI). And of Gulf & Western (which 
owns Paramount) merging with MCA. 
And we have a group called the "Free-
dom of Expression Foundation" lobby-
ing hard in Washington to repeal what 
little is left of the cross-ownership rules. 
Let the newspapers in a town control 
the over-the-air stations as well. The 
Foundation is funded by the Atlanta 
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Journal and Constitution, Chicago 
Tribune, Gannett Foundation, Newhouse 
Foundation, Scripps Howard Broadcast-
ing, and Times Mirror, among others. 
Its goals have been endorsed, it claims, 
by the American Newspaper Publishers 
Foundation and the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors. 
The Freedom of Expression Founda-
tion's literature describes its purpose as 
follows: "Newspaper publishers are de-
nied the right to acquire a broadcast 
license in the same market solely because 
of their ownership of non-broadcast mass 
media facilities ... the rules force broad-
caster and newspaper publisher to choose 
only one medium of expression to em-
ploy in a given market and, as a con-
sequence, restrict their freedom of 
expression." Let's get this straight: the 
Times Mirror is restricted in its freedom 
of expression to several million news-
papers each day and, of course, cable 
holdings-but is deprived of control of 
the major Los Angeles over-the-air tele-
vision stations. Certainly the rest of us 
feel that this first amendment limitation 
is outrageous and that all of our infor-
mation, or as much as possible, should 
emanate from or through this single en-
lightened source. 
Conclusion 
We can worry about the fairness of 
elections in Nicaragua. We can worry 
about the growing economic power of 
Japan. We can worry about the corrupt-
ive influence of campaign contributions 
on the American political system. We 
can worry about a lot of things-and 
with good reason. But this one has to be 
at the top. Because if we lose this one, 
we may lose control over the means of 
correcting all of them. With concentra-
tion of ownership, local cable monopo-
lies, and cross-ownership, our informa-
tion can be channelled and choked from 
the top. A system of pluralism and checks 
and balances, of political democracy and 
economic marketplace democracy, be-
comes very quickly something far differ-
ent. And because terrible abuses which 
may be soberly predicted flow from a 
structure which does not set off immedi-
ate alarm bells, we might not know we 
have lost this war until it has concluded. 
The tragedy here comes not from a single 
dramatic act which focuses our attention, 
but from a structure which is now in-
exorably creeping into place. Where is 
the American minuteman rushing to the 
hearth for rifle in our common defense? 
How much time do we have? 
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